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ABSTRACT
We study a model of exit in which the stage payoffs are governed by a
nonstationary Markov process that reflects the stochastic evolution of the
industry. For a monopolist, our model is an optimal stopping problem. For
duopolists, we analyze the (perfect) stopping time equilibria of the exit game.
1. INTRODUCTION
In contrast to the literature on entry, the study of exit decisions by
firms in oligopolistic industries in much less extensive. Ghemawat and
Nalebuff (1985) analyze a continuous time, perfect information model for an
asymmetric duopoly in a deterministically declining industry, where the firms
differ by their capacities and related fixed costs per period. Unless the
high-fixed-cost firm has significantly lower operating costs than the
low-fixed-cost firm, the unique perfect Nash equilibrium in their model is for
the firm with the larger capacity and fixed costs to exit at the first time
that its duopoly profits are nonpositive. The smaller firm then remains until
its monopoly profits become negative.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) also analyze an asymmetric duopoly exit game
in a continuous time model with deterministic demand paths. However, they
assume that each firm does not know the fixed operating cost per period of its
rival. Thus their model is a war of attrition where each firm continually
revises downward its estimate of the other's costs, as long as the contest for
the market lasts. With an asuumption that each firm assesses positive
probability that its rival will never find it optimal to exit, the model
yields a unique perfect Nash equilibrium where the higher cost firm exits the
market before the firm with lower costs.
In this paper, we study a model of exit in which the stage payoffs are
governed by a nonstationary Markov process that reflects the stochastic
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market and/or cost evolution of the industry. Our model of firms' exit
decisions is closely related to the well-known optimal stopping problems.
(See Breiman (1964), Dynkin and Yushkavich (1969), and references in Monahan
(1980).) The essential features of this class of problems are:
1) a random device that moves from state to state under a probability
law;
2) a payoff and decision structure such that, after observing the
current state, the decision maker has a choice of two decisions: take
the accumulated payoff to date and quit (exit the market), or pay a
fee for the privilege of remaining active for one more transition
(stay in the market).
The differences between our model and standard optimal stopping problems
are: (1) there are multiple players in the game and (2) each player's payoffs
are affected by the stopping rules adopted by the others.
To analyze this situation, we make a natural extension of the optimal
stopping time concept and define a stopping time equilibrium, which is a Nash
equilibrium in stopping time strategies. (Our concept of stopping time
equilibrium is not unlike that of Ghemawat and Nalebuff or Fudenberg and
Tirole, except that in their models the single firm optimal stopping problem
is of little interest because their models have deterministic demand paths.)
In general, any stochastic dynamic game in which each player's strategy is a
single dichotomous decision at each stage can be formulated as a stopping time
problem. Further, in such games, the notion of equilibrium stopping time can
be applied. For this type of game, we show that the stopping time equilibria
III
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correspond to the subgame perfect equilibria in the natural extensive form
game.
In contrast to the results of Ghemawat and Nalebuff, and Fudenberg and
Tirole (each of whom obtains a unique perfect equilibrium in a continuous
time, deterministic model), there may be multiple exit time equilibria in our
stochastic, discrete time framework. We characterize the generic form of any
equilibrium in our model. These equilibria are obtained by solving a
time-indexed sequence of fixed point problems. As a consequence of the
multiplicity of the equilibria, the stronger or more patient firm, which has a
stage-payoff advantage or higher discount rate, may not always exit last.
Among the equilibria, two are particularly interesting because they provide
the upper and lower bounds for any equilibrium exit times and because each
player prefers one of the two equilibria to all possible other equilibria. In
particular, each firm favors the equilibrium which makes his active period the
longest. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the "natural"
equilibrium (in which the stronger or more patient firm always outlasts its
rival) to be the unique perfect equilibrium.
One characteristic of the firms' optimal policies in our model is that one
or both firms may earn negative profits in some period(s), but remain in the
market. This can occur for either of two reasons. First, industry demand can
suffer a stochastic negative shock, such that, demand will increase in the
next period, in expectation. In such cases, firms will absorb the loss in
that period, knowing that demand is likely to recover. This result accords
with observed practice. Most industries experience stochastic downturns that
do not lead to mass exit from the industry. A firm may also choose to absorb
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losses and remain in the market in the expectation that its rival will exit
the industry first, leaving a more profitable, monopolistic industry for the
remaining firm. Although the former effect is unique to our model, the latter
effect is also present in the Fudenberg-Tirole formulation.
For both the single-firm and two-firm cases, we solve examples with linear
demand and linear costs. For the single-firm example, the optimal exit time
is decreasing in the firm's unit costs, the slope of the demand curve, and the
per unit fixed cost of being in the market. The optimal exit time increases
in the firm's discount factor. In the two-firm example with Cournot
competition, these results also hold for each firm. In addition, the high
cost firm's optimal exit time decreases in the low cost firm's unit costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the
exit game is formulated as a stopping time problem and the notion of the
stopping time equilibrium is introduced. Section 3 is devoted to a thorough
discussion and analysis of the single firm optimal stopping problem. Building
on the results of Section 3, the main results regarding equilibrium exit
behavior in a duopoly are proved and discussed in Section 4. Concluding
remarks and possible extensions follow in Section 5.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
We study an industry of risk-neutral duopolists facing a downward drifting
stochastic demand function. The underlying demand stream is indexed by a
sequence of independent random variables (at}. For each period t, the
demand at takes value in Z c R and has a probability measure Xt on
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Z. For convenience, we assume Z R in the later discussion. In order
to formulate a downward drifting demand representing a shrinking market, we
use the familiar notion of stochastic dominance.
Definition 1. Suppose X and are probability measures on Z. X
stochastically dominates , written X > if and only if
X(Lb) > (Lb) for all b , where Lb fzcZlz>b).
Assumption 1. Xt stochastically dominates Xt+l for all t > 0.
Assumption 1 implies that the probability of the demand at exceeding any
given level decreases over time; hence firms face a shrinking market.
For i,j 1,2, denoted by ij(at) the payoff to firm i in period
t,given there are j firms in the market and the demand is at
Assumption 2. ij(') are increasing for i,j - 1,2 and
Ti2(z) œ< il(Z) for il,2 and zeZ.
That is, either firm will prefer high demand to low demand and will prefer
having the market to itself to sharing the market.
At each time t, any active firms observe (as; s t). Then each
simultaneously makes a dichotomous decision about whether to continue and get
Til(at) or i2(at) (depending on the number of firms in the
market), or to exit and get zero profit thereafter (Reentry is prohibitively
costly). The strategy of firm i then is a random time
III
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Ti : - N = {0)1,2,...} where is the space of sample paths of
{a , t>0}. We require T to be stopping time for i 1,2.
t -i
Formally, let F t = o(a; s<t), the a-field generated by
{a ;s<t}. We may think of Ft as the information available at time
t obtained by observing {as; s < t}. A random time T: 2 - N is
said to be a stopping time of (Ft) if {T<t}CF t for every
teN. In other words, information Ft available at time t is sufficient
to tell whether the event {T<t} has occurred. It can be shown that if T
is a stopping time, then {T>t}cFt for t>0. Therefore, the payoff
(as a function of T) to firm i, i j, at time t is completely determined
by observing the history (a ;s<t), i.e.,
t ( t' ) Ti2( t ){T>t} il( t)l{T<t} 
Let Bi(0 < i < 1) be the discount factor for firm i. Then firm
i's problem is an optimal stopping problem if its opponent's exit time, Tj,
is also a stopping time. Given T j i, a stopping time, let
T-1
vi i (at,Tj)l( T (T) I a0},
T t=O
for i - 1,2, where the supremum is over all possible stopping times T.
Definition 2. (T1, T2) is a stopping time equilibrium if T1, T2 are
stopping times and for i1,2, and j i,
Ti-1
0i (aO E { o t rri(a t sTj)l( ,)(T i) T a o}.v0 a0 ) E t ' 0tO
Introducing the above notion of stopping time equilibrium facilitates
mathematical treatment of a stochastic dynamic game involving dichotomous
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decisions by applying existing results in the optimal stopping time
literature. Also, we can see later that there is an equivalence between the
stopping time equilibria and the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the
extensive form game.
Finally, we have one more technical assumption.
Let ti = inf {t:i (a ) < 0, a.s.} and t = max {t }.
i,j
Assumption 3. 0 < t* < ~.
The assumption that t* > 0 avoids a trivial case and the assumption
t* < w guarantees that both firms will exit in finite time.
3. THE SINGLE FIRM MODEL - EXIT AS OPTIMAL STOPPING TIME
We first examine the single player optimal stopping problem in our
setting. Let (at) denote the monopoly profits available to the firm when
the demand is at. Let be the firm's discount factor.
Define
T-1
vt(at) - sup E[ n (a+t)(0,) at]. (1)
T n=O
For each t, let St be the optimal stopping time for (1). We define the set
Bt C Z such that if at c Bt, then St O and vt(at) = O. Alternately, if
at tB Z \ Bt, then St 1 + St+l and vt(a t) n(at) + E[v (a t+)Iat]
In other words, if the firm is in the market at time t, then whether to exit
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at time t depends only on at the current state of demand. Thus, a sequence of
Borel sets, {B0, B1, B2,...}, determines the optimal stopping time,
t-l
T - SO inf {t :at Bt} or {Tt} { n Bs Bt }
Proposition 1. Any optimal stopping time can be characterized by
T inf{t : at Bt}. Furthermore Bt {ut(a t) < 0} or B {ut(a t) < 0t t t t t t t t
a.s., where ut(at) - (at) + wt+ and
wt+1 E [ (t+l(at) )(t+l(at+l)) with w= 0 for t > t
Proof: It is sufficient to show that for every t > O,
P{{ut(at) > o } n B } = 0 and
P{{ut(at) < } n Bt } 0. (2)
We use backward induction. For t > t*, (2) is trivially true since
ut(a t) r t(at) < 0 a.s. and the firm if in the market, will exit; i.e.
P(B{} = 0.
Now assume (2) is true for s > t + 1. Then ate{u t (at) > O }n Bt
implies vt(at) O0 but ut(at) - rt(at) + Bw t+1 - t(at)
+ E [Vt+l(at+l)l (at+)] > 0. Hence S 0 is not optimal. Similarly,
t+l t
ate {Ut(a t ) < O} n Bt implies Ut(at) ITr(a t ) + E[vt+l(at)l +l(at)] < 0
t+l
but St > 1. Again, St is not optimal.
Q.E.D.
Corollary 1. Suppose { Xt; t - 1,2,...) are absolutely continuous. Then
T - inf{t:ut(at) < 0} is the unique optimal stopping time where ut(')
are defined in Proposition 1.
III
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Proof: The continuity of Xt implies P{ut(a t) = 0} O for every
t > 0. Thus Bt {ut(at) < O} a.s.
Q.E.D.
Note that if the probability distribution of a t is discrete and
P{ut(a t ) - O} > 0 for some a t , there can be multiple optimal
stopping times. However, it is uninteresting to distinguish among them
because each gives the same optimal objective value and the difference is not
qualitative or structural. So, we will concentrate our discussion on the
smallest optimal stopping time, namely, T - inf t - ut(at) < 0)}.
Notice that ut(a t) (at) + wt+l. If we define ht -l(-Bw )
and Bt zZ z < ht}, then {ut(a t) < } {at ht} at Bt. We will
investigate some properties of w t, ht and sets Bt which define the optimal
stopping time T.
Lemma 1. Suppose f(.), f2() are increasing functions and
fl(z) > f2(z), for zZ. And suppose Zl, z2 are random variables with probability
measures P1' 2 respectively. Moreover, P1 stochastically dominates 2.' Then
E [fl(Zl)l(O,)(fl(zl)] > E [f2(z2)1(0 )(f2(z  2
and strictly inequality holds if El (0 )fl(zl)] > 0.
Proof: Since f(z) > f2(z) implies fl(z) > 0} {f2(z) > 0)} and > 2
E[fl(z )l (0)(f(zI))] f  f (z)dX (z)1 1 (O,) 1 1 {f 1 (z)>O} 1 1
>_ f Z l(z)d ) > f >f 2(z)>}fl()d(Z) {f2()> ( Z)
> f (z)> f (z)dXl2(z)
{f2(z)>I} 2E 2()
i Ef2(z2) 1(,)(f2(z2))]. Q.E.D.2 2 (O,~~~~~~~') 2 ~~Q..D
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Proposition 2: w t > W t+, for 0 < t < t*-l.
Proof: By the definition of t*,
wt,_l E[~(at*l)l(O,)(T(at*,_l))] > 0 wt,.
Suppose wt+l -Wt+2 > 0 for 0 < t < t*-2. Note that u t() is increasing
since (') is increasing and u t(z) - ut+l(z) (wt+lWt+2) > 0. Lemma 1
implies w t > wt+l since wt E[ut(at)l )(ut(at))]. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2: ht is increasing in t and Bt - Bt+l for 0 > t > t*-l.
Proof: Simply note that (') is increasing and wt is decreasing in t by
Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Figure 1 illustrates a sample path of {at}, ht as a function of t,
and the optimal stopping time T. The dashed horizontal line represents
z = l (0). For t > 0, at falls above the line implies (at) > 0 and
otherwise (at) < 0. The cutoff points ht always lie below this line. Thus,
the firm is willing to sustain a certain level of current loss to garner the
expected future gain. More explicitly, the firm finds it optimal to remain
active even when (at) < 0 as long as the expected future gain r(at) + wt+ 1
exceeds zero, i.e., a t > ht. The lower the ht, the heavier current loss
that the firm is willing to tolerate, in expectation of future profits.
Example 1
Consider a monopolist who faces a stochastic linear demand function and
produces a homogeneous good at constant cost c. The random variable at is
the intercept of the inverse demand and the constant b is the slope. The
opportunity cost of staying in the market is k. (Alternately, the firm has to
pay a fixed fee, k, each period in order to participate in the production
III
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activity.) Then, at each period t, the maximum profit that the monopolist can
obtain is
(a -c)2
(at ) = b - k if at > cnt ) t 4b
-k otherwise.
Clearly (-) is an increasing function. Also (at) - (at,b,c,k) decreases as
c, b, or k increases. This fact, together with a recursive application of
Lemma 1, implies wt+l is decreasing as c,b, or k increases or decreases. Thus,
h c + / 4b(k-w t+) if k > w t
c otherwise.
increases as c,b,k increases or 8 decreases. And hence T decreases almost
surely as c,b,k increases or decreases. That is, the monopolist optimally
exits earlier when the marginal cost of production if higher, a better
alternative opportunity exits (a higher k), the price is less sensitive to the
quantity change (a higher b), or the firm is less patient (a smaller ).
We summarize these comparative statics results in the following
proposition and give a formal proof.
Proposition 3: If '(z) < "(z) for z c Z or ' < ", then w t < wt
ht > ht for t > 0 and T' < T" almost surely.
Proof: Let t' - inf{t : n'(a t ) < 0, a.s.} and t" - inf{t : T"(at) < 0, a.s.}.
Assume t" < . Obviously t' < t". For t > t", w t wt 0 O. Assume that
wt+ < w+
.
We want to show w < w. This follows from the fact
that ut(z) = 1'(z) + wt+ < FT"(z) + Wt+l - ut(z) and an application of
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9 §e -1
Lemma 1. Then h > ht is obvious by noticing that h = (-w t+l,t- t tt+l
-a' < and wt < wt . In turn, ht ht implies Bt D Bt and Bt C Bt, for
t , t 
t > 0. Thus, {T'> t} { n B } C { n } T" > t} for every t > O.
So T' < T" almost surely.
The results for ' < " follow from a similar argument. Q.E.D.
Proppsition 3 provides a very convenient tool for dealing with the
comparative statics analysis of the optimal stopping time. It says that
looking at the stage payoff is sufficient.
4. THE DUOPOLY MODEL - EXIT AS EQUILIBRIUM STOPPING TIME
We now bring our discussion back to the duopoly model set up in Section
2. First, we classify the players' conditions by making the following
definitions.
Definition 1: Firm 1 is stronger than Firm 2 if lj (z) > n2j(z) for j-1,2
and every z.
Definition 2: Firm 1 is more patient than Firm 2 if B1 > 2.
For convenience, later in the discussion, the statement that Firm 1 is
stronger (more patient) than Firm 2 implies they have identical patience
(strength) unless we explicitly state otherwise. Our interest lies on the
investigation of the equilibrium exit times for asymmetric firms.
III
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Next, we solve four single-firm problems, two for each firm. That is, by
applying the results in the previous section, we derive the optimal exit time
for each firm i as if there were firms in the market throughout i's stay in
the market. Each single-firm problem is indexed by i and j and takes
ir j(.) as the stage payoff. Following the notation in Section 3, define
recursively for i-'1,2, j'1,2.
t t ij t it+l,uiJ(at) - "i(at ) + Hi Wt+l,
wij - E uij (a ) 1 (uij (a ))],
t+l t+l (at+ l) l(0,)(ut+ t+l
with wij = 0 for t > tij . By Propositions 1-3 we have the following results.
Fact 1: Tij inf {t : a < hJ) is the optimal stopping time where
ii ijhi - 1 (-B w )Fact 2: w j are decreasing in t and ht are increasing in t for all i,j.t t
ii 12 ii 2 *Fact 3: For i-1,2, wt > wi for t il-, wt w t ' for t > til,
hil < hi2 for t > 0, and T > T almost surely.
t t i -i2
Fact 4: If Firm 1 is stronger than Firm 2, then for J1,2, wlj > wtj for
t < < ht for t > 0, and Tj > T2 almost surely.
- ij t tI- -- 2j lo r >
Fact 5: If Firm 1 is more patient than Firm 2, then for j-1,2, wl > w2tj,
hlj < h2 for t < tlj-2, and T 1 > T 2 almost surely.t " '"
Figure 2 plots hitj as a function of t, a realization of process at and
stopping times Tij for the case that Firm 1 is stronger than Firm 2. One
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conclusion we can draw from these single-firm problems is that for each i, the
single-firm optimal stopping times Til and Ti2 impose upper and lower
bounds for its equilibrium stopping time Ti, i.e., Ti2 < Ti < Til
almost surely. The intuitive argument goes as follows. At any time t, it is
i2
not i's best response to exit as long as at is above h . This follows
i2because Wt+1 is the expected profit from t+l on obtained by acting
optimally in the situation when other firm will be in the market throughout
i2
the game. Therefore, wt+1 is the minimum possible future gain that firm
ii can guarantee for itself. Assuming wt+l is the expected equilibrium
profit from t+l on, we always have
i 12 i >2
wt+l wt+l and ij(at) + iwt+l >_ i2(at) i+ Btt+l
for J-1,2, and hence Firm i will stay active at time t. By a similar argument,
il il
Firm i will exit whenever at falls below h since wt+1l is the highest
possible expected future gain from t+l on in the most optimistic situation,
i.e., when he will be in the market alone from t+l on.
Proposition 4. Suppose (T1,T2) is an exit time equilibrium and
Ti inf{t a B . Then B il B C B for t > 0 andTi inf{t = at Bit} Then Bt _ it - t
Ti2 < Ti < Til, almost surely, for il,2.
Proposition 4 provides the upper and lower bounds of the equilibrium exit
times. These bounds do not depend on the other player's strategy. We will
find out the precise bounds for the equilibrium stopping times later. But,
these single-firm stopping time problems play an important role in guiding the
investigation.
We now turn to an asymmetric situation in which one firm is stronger or
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more patient. The generic form of an exit time equilibrium is characterized
in Proposition 5. Proposition 6 provides the precise bounds for any possible
equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Suppose Firm 1 is stronger or more patient. Any exit time
equilibrium (T1,T2) can be characterized as Ti inf{t:at B it} for il,2,
11 - 2 211
-Ah ]UA B ( 1, a Borel set,
Bit ht U At, B2t At U (ht where At (h a Borel set,
it " Z\Bit,hit i2 (-i wt+) and wi are defined recursively as follows:
i = 0, for t > t
i il
ut(at) (Ti2 (a) + i wt+l) -1 (a),
+ ( il(a) iWt+l) B yl (at), for ji
i i i
wt E [ut(at ) l(0 )(ut(at))].
Moreover, w 2 < wt < w for i-1,2, t > O.
Proof: Backward induction.
For t > t, P{T (at) > } 0, i,j - 1,2. So P{at Bit} <
-- i t t it
i2 i w1
P{ 11(at) > 0} ' O and P{at Bit 1 for il,2. Also wt W W ' O
for i1l,2. The proposition is trivially true.
i2 <li T wiNow assume that it is true for s > t+l. Then w+ < w < w+l
t+l - t+l - t+l
implies ht < h < ht for i1,2. At time t, given any strategy Firm 2il i< i2
adopts (B2t, B2t), Firm 1 knows that he will be a monopolist from t on if
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at e B2t or he will be involved in a game which gives expected payoff
1
wt+l if equilibrium strategies follow from t+l on. Remaining active at
t, Firm 1 expects to get
ut(at) (12(at) + lw (a+l) ) + (1 1(at) + 3t+ ) 1B2 (at)1 2 t t+l rt
where wt+l is defined as in the proposition. Firm 's best response then is
to exit if ut(a ) < 0 and stay if u(a) > 0. Let Blt {u(a) <O}andt t t 1 It {t t }
Blt i {u1(a t) > 0}. Note that {l12(at) + Wt+l > O} {a>hl}
ll(a) + + > {at > h nd B2t B 2t 0B2t B U 2t 
= t 11 1have Bt {B2t n (m, h t]} U {B2t (, h ]}
Blt= {B2t n (h t' )} U {B 2t n (h, )}. (3)
Given the strategy of Firm 1, if 2 does not exit at t, he will expect
2 1
t(a t) (22(at) + 2Wt+ lBlt(at)
21 i (a)
+ (n 21(at) + 2Wt+l) l(a).
and 2's best response should satisfy
B2t (Bt n (-, h U 2Blt n (  h 2]}
21 2
s2t ' (It n (ht ,)} U {B n (ht )}(4)
But,
Blt n(h ,) ' ) {{B2tn (-, h 1 } U B2n (-, t]}} n (h 21 )It (t 2t t 2t t t
B2 n (h 2 1 , h1 ] since h11 < h21
2t n (h ,h U {Bet t  t
2 1 2
it t 2to t 2tn t t
III
-17-
- (ht, )\{B2n (h h]}t'2t t' t
11 < 2 < 2since h <h 21 < h andt - t- t'
-2t {2t n (h21 , Ihl U {(ht. a)\ {B2 t n (h. h1 ]}}2t 2t ' t t2 
{B2 n (h2 h1 U (h a)t t tv 21 2since h h
Thus B2t is equilibrium if and only if B2t satisfy
B-{ f 21 1 2
B2t ' {B2t n (ht ht]} U (ht, )}
The only possible solution is of the form
B2t ' At U (ht. ),
21 1
At C (h t t].
And B2t is just the complement of B2t, i.e.
B2t 2t (-, ht], t '- z\At.t t
It is worth mentioning that if f(B) (B n (he ,h]l} U (hc ), a
mapping from a Borel set in Z to a Borel set in Z, then B2t is an equilibrium
strategy if and only if B2t is a fixed point of f2t(-), i.e., f2t(B2t) B2t.
By (3),
.( 11
B t (-, h t ]UA t, andit t t
11
Blt' (ht ) n At
i2 i <il i2 i iiFinally, note that since w+ < wt+ 1 < i ut2(a) < ui(a) < ul (at+ - t+ - Wt+lI t (a - t - t t
which implies wi2 < wi < wil by Lemma 1. We conclude the
t tQ.E.- tD.
induction. Q.E.D.
Despite the complicated set operations involved in the proof, the
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inituition of the equilibrium behavior is rather clear. Considering Firm 2's
2
problem, for at > ht, a positive expected profit is guaranteed so he
does not exit. For a < h21 , he will definitely exit since he cannot
get a positive gain even if he has the market to himself. For at C
(h2t, hl], if Firm 2 does not exit, then Firm 1 will find himself in
t t
a duopoly which yields a negative expected profit and will then exit, but 2
still enjoys a positive expected profit given that Firm 1 exits at t. Note
that this opportunity does not always exist. For example, if h 21 > h, then
t .
(h 21 h] is an empty set.
t t
The importance of Proposition 5 lies in the fact that it characterizes all
possible equilibria. In particular, it points out that we can obtain all
equilibria by varying At , a Borel subset contained in the interval
21 1(ht , h ], for every t. Among them are two extreme equilibria which
give the precise upper and lower bounds on any equilibrium exit times
(T 1 , T2). The first of these, (T1, T2 ) is obtained by letting At = ,
C- h11] C-Xh 22
then B (- X, hll] B't = (- X, ht2, almost surely for every t. In fact,It t 2t t
(T T2) (Tll, T22)' The second, (T1, T2) is obtained by letting
2 1 1 11 21 1 21 1 -2
At s (ht ,ht], then B = (, h ]U(h t (ht , ht], B2 t (ht h]U(h a)
1 -2 1 -2 21 1Here , h , wt are the functions specified in Proposition 5 with At (ht ht ]'
Proposition 6: Let (T1, T2) be an equilibrium. Then T1 T1 T1
and T2 < T2 < T2, almost surely.
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* 11 1 1 
Proof: Note that for t > tll, t "w t w t 0o
-2 2 22
and w t wt = wt
Assume w 1 > wl > W1t+l- t+l -Wt+l
-
2 > 2 > 2 2
and wt+ > wt+ > t+1wt+ 1 -- t+1 -- Wt+l·
11 h 1 1< h1Then, h <h -<htt-t- -t
11 - 11And Bt I (', h ] C (, h t ]U At Blt
C ( h1 1 U (h 2 h1 C 11 U h21 1 ,
t 't t ' -ht] - t
B~t h22 O 2)(h 00) CA U (ht. c)2 t t -t t
21 1 2 21 1 -2
_ C(h , h] U (h, ) C (h ht] U (h ,) B'ttt t t 2t
11 1 1 -2 2 21It follows that ut (a t ) > Ut(a) >u(a t) and u t (a t )> (a t ) > u (a t)
for every att We ust show ult(a t) > u (at ) as an example.t t --t t
i 1
ut(at ) - (12(at) + lWt+l )
11
+ (ll(at) + lWt+l )
1> (2(at) + l wt+l)
11
+ ( 11 (at) + lt+l )
-t (a t )
1-"(a )
B2t)
1B2t t
1B n (a ) u1 (a )2t
ince t > t+ B2t C B and B2t B" 2t Applying Lemma 1 again, we havesince w2t a -2t- 2t'
w1 1 > w > 
t - -t
-2 > w2 > 22and w w > wL . The induction is completed.
As a result, Bt B B' and B B B imply that T <Tit It it 2 Bt 2t 2t -- - 11<T1
and T2 T < T2 2 
O0.
Q.E.D.
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Since Firm 1 is assumed to be stronger or more patient, the first extreme
case (Tll, T22) is the more appealing equilibrium. This equilibrium is
simple in structure, i.e., a cut-off equilibrium. One characterization of
this equilibrium is that the stronger firm behaves as if he were a monopolist
while the weaker firm exits as if he has no chance to be a monopolist.
Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) show that the equilibrium of this kind is the
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in their deterministic, continuous time
model. Their result depends on their continuous time formulation and does not
hold here. Proposition 6 suggests a necessary and sufficient condition for
(Tll,T22) to be the unique equilibrium, i.e., T 11 T1 and T 22 T2. The
following proposition provides this condition.
Proposition 7: Suppose Firm 1 is stronger or more patient. Then (Tll, T22)
is the unique equilibrium if and only if P{a t e (h21, hI]} 0
for 1 < t < t2 -1 where t2 = inf {t: P{a t c B2 } t 0}
-2 t 2t
Proof: For t - t 2-1, P{at B 0 or P{t C (h21, h] U (2 .
~2l ~ ' t 2t t - t t
This implies that Bt B a.s. and consequently B't B" . Assume2t 2t lt 1t
Bi+ Bit+l a.s. It then follows that h i = hi which together with theit+l it;+l -t t
condition P{at (ht 2 h]} O0 imply that Bt B"t a.s. for il,2. Thet t -t it it
sufficiency follows.
To prove the necessary conditions, let
21 1
t sup {s: 1 < s < t2-l, Pa t (h ' --s] > O.
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Then,
t-1 21 1
P({T > T ) > P{(ao,....a ) E f B n(h h 2 -2 _n £ B}2s t -t
t- 21 1
= Pfas c BJt'} + P{a (h 1 h] > 
s0
t-l t-l
since n B' c n B"
8 0 2s - 8=0 2s
21 1 2 and (ht h Bl n Bj2t 2t
Example 2
A Cournot duopoly faces a stochastic linear inverse demand,
and produces a homogeneous good at constant costs ci, i - 1,2.
C1 < c2. Firm i's opportunity cost of staying in the market is
both firms are in the market, the equilibrium stage payoffs are
(a t -2c 1 + c2 )2
9b
Pt at - bQ,
Assume that
ki
.
If
if a t > 2c2 - c1
Tr1 2(a) - f (a t - C)2
4b if c <at 2c2 - cl
otherwise.
(a - 2c2 + C)2t 2
9b
- k2
if a t > 2c2 - cl
otherwise.
If one firm is in the market alone, the monopoly stage profits are as derived in
Q.E.D.
22(at) I
 i-LII-·-------- I_-
- k1
- k1
- k 1
-k2
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Example 1, for i 1,2,
(at - c )2
t I 4b - ki if a > c
œil(at) - --
- ki otherwise.
It is easy to see that il(at) > ti2(at) for i 1,2 and every a t and if c1 < c2,
kl I k 2 or c1 c2, < k2, then Firm 1 is stronger, i.e., > (a) for1 2 2k 1 k2, rlj(at) _ 2jat
j 1,2 and every at.
From the general results obtained earlier, we know that (T1 1, T22) is an
exit equilibrium The11 22
exit equilibrium. The functions ht , ht can be calculated as follows:
c + /4b(k - w1 1 ) if k 11
1 c1 1 lwt+l if >81 wY +
ht {
c1 otherwise.
_ _ '1~~ 22 22
22 c2 c1 + /9b(k 2 82wt+l if k 2 2Wt+l
22 - c1 otherwtse.
11And t c increases as cl, h, kl increases or 1 decreases, while
h22 increases as c2, b, k2 increases or cl, B2 decreases. Thust
T11 increases almost surely as c1, b, k1 decreases or 1 increases and
T22 increases almost surely as c2, b, k2 decreases or cl, 2 increases.
We conclude this section by pointing out that the stopping time equilibria
and the subgame perfect equilibria actually are equivalent. By way of
constructing a stopping time equilibrium in Proposition 5, it is clear that the
stopping time Ti = inf{s: s > t, as C Bis} constitute an equilibrium
for the remaining subgame, given the firms surviving until t. Conversely, if we
-23-
analyze the exit problem in an extensive form game assuming players have perfect
recall of the historic information but not the future, etc., then any subgame
perfect equilibrium is a stopping time equilibrium.
Proposition 8. The stopping time equilibria are subgame perfect.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper illustrates how a stochastic dynamic game like exit can be
formulated as a stopping time problem, how a stopping time equilibrium can be
found by solving a sequence of fixed point problems, and how to derive the
properties that the stopping time equilibria possess.
There are several interesting extensions or variations, both mathematical
and economic, that might be explored in the continuation of this work. A
straightforward, but notationally burdensome, generalization is the exit game
for an n-firm oligopoly. The equilibrium in which the stronger or more
patient firms exits later always exists if the firms are ordered in strength
or patience. A second direction for generalizing the model is to incorporate
entry decisions into the model to study the firm's behavior over the life
cycle of an industry. Though we only discuss the exit problem for oligopoly
here, the approach employed can easily be applied to entry problems as well.
Examples are entering a market, entering, continuing, or abandoning research
in patent races, etc. We provide a guideline for approaching a class of
problems with similar stochastic dynamic features. Finally, other interesting
extensions may include stopping time equilibria in stochastic exit games with
-24-
incomplete information (as in Fudenberg and Tirole) and stochastic exit games
in continous time. In the latter, it may be possible to use the proof
technique of Ghemawat and Nalebuff to derive a unique perfect equilibrium for
the model.
-25-
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Figure 2. Four single-firm stopping problems in the duopoly model.
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